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RECENT CASES
the property and looked to the bond for the assessed value of the
automobile at the time it was seized.'8 In either case the defendant
or his bondsman would be responsible for the loss in value due to
the damage, and since defendant evidently is insolvent, the bonds-
man would be responsible. If defendant is insolvent and if the
mechanic does not have an effective lien because of the priority of
plaintiff's claim, the bondsman has been unjustly enriched at the ex-
pense of the mechanic. Thus it seems there were adequate grounds
for an action in quasi-contract 9 or in equity.
20
Both the intervening mechanic and the court 2' appear to have
misunderstood the law of this case. The mechanic misconstrued his
remedy and attempted to enforce a lien, instead of relying on quasi-
contract or his equitable remedy. The court used the wrong basis
for its decision that the plaintiff's interest was superior to the mechan-
ics lien. If a similar case were to arise in the future, a mechanic should
not be hampered by this decision, for as long as he does not miscon-
strue his remedy and attempt to rely upon his lien, the question of
priority of claims will not arise, and the present case will be irrele-
vant. However, if the question of priority should arise again, the court
should acknowledge the mistake made in this case and place the
decision on a sound basis of law.
Carl R. Clontz
Toxts-CoNmwuTroRY NEGLiGENcE:-EFFEcr OF TE VIOLrTON OF A
STATuTE BY AN EiGHT-YEAR-OLD Cim.- Plaintiff brought suit to re-
cover damages for injuries sustained by his eight-year-old and five-
year-old sons who were struck by defendant's automobile as they
were crossing a street where there was no crosswalk. The eight-year-
18KRS § 426.300 (1959).
19 Since "the law implies a promise where the party ought to promise," the
bondsman might be liable on an implied contract. See Goodall v. Warden's
Adrn'r, 280 Ky. 632, 133 S.W.2d 944 (1939); see also, Fayette Tob. Whse.'Co.
v. Lexington Tob. Bd. of Trade, 299 S.W.2d 640 (Ky. 1957); Kellum v. Brown-
ing's Adm'r, 231 Ky. 308, 21 S.W.2d 459 (1929).
20 One theory would be equitable subrogation. Since the bondsman would
have been liable to the plaintiff for the damages to the automobile, the mechanic
has in effect "paid" the debt of the bondsman. Since he was not a volunteer,
the mechanic, to prevent unjust enrichment, should be subrogated to the plain-
tiff's rights against the bondsman. See Chapman v. Blackburn, 295 Ky. 606, 175
S.W.2d 26 (1943); McCracken County v. Lakeview Country Club, 254 Ky.
515, 70 S.W.2d 938 (1934).
21 The plaintiff also failed, for the court pointed out in the opinion that
the briefs only argued the question of whether the plaintiff was required to




old child was in the third grade at school, and there was no evidence
introduced to indicate his capacity for being contributorily negligent.
His act of crossing the street without yielding the right of way to
defendant's vehicle was a statutory violation.1 An instruction was
given on contributory negligence to the effect that it was the eight-
year-old child's duty at the time and place of the accident to exercise
ordinary care for his own safety. This instruction did not refer to the
younger boy. Also, an instruction was presented which provided
that it was the statutory duty of the eight-year-old child to yield
the right of way to defendant's car if the jury believed that defend-
ants approaching vehicle at that time constituted an immediate hazard
to the child's safety if he continued across the street. The trial court
entered judgment on a verdict for the defendant. Held: Reversed.
In the absence of evidence indicating the eight-year-old child's
capacity for being contributorily negligent, it is error to give an in-
struction on contributory negligence, and it is error to give an instruc-
tion relating to his statutory duty. Baldwin v. Hosley, 328 S.W.2d
426 (Ky. 1959).
The result in this case affirms the previous Kentucky decisions
on the capacity of infants to be contributorily negligent and places
this jurisdiction in a new position concerning the effect of a viola-
tion of a safety statute by an eight-year-old child. These two prop-
ositions will be discussed in order.
Kentucky has divided the period of infancy into these distinct
categories in considering the capacity of infants to be contributorily
negligent. Children under seven years of age are irrebuttably pre-
sumed to have no capacity for contributory negligence.2 Between
the ages of seven and fourteen, a rebuttable presumption exists that
they have no capacity for contributory negligence3 If the child is
in this latter age group, sufficient evidence must be presented to over-
come the presumption before the question of contributory negligence
can either be submitted to the jury4 or decided as a matter of law.5
The jury or court must then determine whether there has been com-
plance with the standard of care with which the child is charged.
This standard is usually that conduct to be expected6 of a child
IKy. Rev. Stat. § 189.570(4)(a) (1959).2 See, for example, Lever Bros. Co. v. Stapleton, 313 Ky. 837, 233 S.W.2d
1002 (1950); Lehman v. Patterson, 298 Ky. 360, 182 S.W.2d 897 (1944).
, See, for example, the consolidated cases of Carr v. Ky. Util. Co. and Stur-
gill's Adm'x v. K7 . Util. Co., 801 S.W.2d 894 (Ky. 1957); United Fuel Gas Co.
v. Friend's Admx, 270 S.W.2d 946 (Ky. 1954); Ward v. Music, 257 S.W.2d
516 (Ky. 1953); Dixon v. Stringer, 277 Ky. 347, 126 S.W.2d 448 (1939).4 Ward v. Music, supra note 3.
5 Dixon v. Stringer, supra note 3.
6 In the principal case, it is stated that the care the youth must use is that
"ordinarily exercised" under the circumstances. This standard is criticized in the
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of like age, intelligence and experience 7 although the exact words do
vary.8 If the child is fourteen or older, there is a presumption that
he has capacity for contributory negligence, and the burden is on
the youth to show want of capacity or understanding.9
Apparently, Kentucky's rule is analogous to the rule applied in
determining the criminal responsibility of an infant.10 By the English
common law, a child under seven years of age is conclusively pre-
sumed to be incapable of committing a crime, and a rebuttable pre-
sumption of incapacity is raised in favor of an infant between the
ages of seven and fourteen."- This analogy is certainly of dubious
validity because the definite age limits are used in criminal law to
establish the age at which children are capable of a criminal intent;
here neither crime nor intent is in question. 12 "While the ... [analogy]
has the merit of simplicity, it is purely arbitrary, and lacks the sanc-
tion of reason and experience." 3 Actually if there is any parallel
which can be drawn to criminal responsibility, it seems that it would
be in the field of intentional torts rather than in contributory negli-
gence. Yet, contrary to any rule that a presumption exists in favor
of the child in this field, it is said by way of dictum that "the law of
this state.., is that an infant is civilly liable for his torts .... 14
The great majority of courts have rejected this analogy to criminal
law,15 although they do hold that very young infants may be con-
case of Neas v. Bohlen, 174 Md. 696, 199 Atl. 852 (1938). The court there held
that the more accurate test was that the care the youth must use is that "reason-
ably to be expected" under the circumstances. It seems that the latter view is
better because the jurors may not know the care "ordinarily exercised" but they
can form an estimate of the care that might "reasonably be expected."
7 Restatement, Torts § 464(2) (1934).
8 See Shulman "The Standard of Care Required of Children," 37 Yale L.J.
618, 620-21 (1928). It is said in this article that although the words vary, the
combination usually consists of three qualities. The most frequent one is age
intelligence and experience. The Kentucky court is inconsistent in the qualities
it uses. See, for example, Richie v. Chears, 288 S.W.2d 660 (Ky. 1956) (age
and capacity to appreciate the danger); United Fuel Gas Co. v. Friend's Admx,
270 S.W.2d 946 (Ky. 1954) (immaturity and want of understanding); Ward v.
Music, 257 S.W.2d 516 (Ky. 1953) (age, experience and mental capacity);
Balback's Adm'r v. Boland-Maloney Lumber, Co., 306 Ky. 647, 208 S.W.2d 940
(1948) (age, capacity and experience; capacity led as descriptive as intelligence).
0 Louisville & N. R.R. v. Hutton, 220 Ky. 277, 295 S.W. 175 (1927).
10Prosser, Torts § 81, at 128 (2d ed. 1955).
11Rex v. Owen, 4 Car. & P. 236, 172 Eng. Rep. 685 (C.P. 1830). Kentucky
adheres to this doctrine in the field of criminal law. See Heilman v. Common-
wealth, 84 Ky. 457, 1 S.W. 731 (1886).
12 Prosser, op. cit. supra note 10, at 128.
13 Johnson's Adm'r v. Rutland R.R., 93 Vt. 132, 140, 106 Adt. 682, 685
(1919).
14 Stephens v. Stephens, 172 Ky. 780, 784-85, 189 S.W. 1143, 1145 (1916).
For cases that hold similarly, see Ellis v. D'Angelo, 253 P. 2d 675 (1953) (four-
year-old child was held liable for violently pushing a baby-sitter); Seaburg v.
Williams, 16 Ill. App. 2d 295, 148 N.E.2d 49 (1958) (six-year-old child might
be held liable for an intentional tort, such as setting a fire).
15 Prosser, op. cit. supra note 10, at 128.
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clusively deemed to lack the capacity for contributory negligence.16
The maximum age at which the child is conclusively presumed to lack
this capacity varies with the jurisdiction. Some of these courts hold
that if the child is younger than three this presumption is applicable.'7
Louisiana holds that a seven-year-old child is not capable, from a
legal standpoint, of being charged with contributory negligence.' s
The other courts fall somewhere between these two views.19 The
effect of this is that all of these jurisdictions rejecting the analogy
to criminal law are in accord that a child under three years old is
irrebuttably presumed to lack this capacity.
It is impossible to establish a definite age at which children are
able to cope with the dangers and risks inherent in any given sit-
uation. In one situation a child may have sufficient capacity to appreci-
ate the risk involved in his conduct and realize its unreasonable
character, but in another the same child may lack the necessary in-
telligence and experience to do so. The mere fact that there is such
a wide variety of judicial opinion on the subject is proof that no
definite age can be accurately established. A solution to this prob-
lem is to use the conclusive presumption of incapacity only when the
child is so young that he manifestly does not possess those qualities
necessary to perceive a risk in any situation and realize its unreason-
able character. All of the courts already recognize that below the
age of three a child is conclusively deemed to lack this capacity.
Above this age, however, there should be no presumption, rebuttable
or irrebuttable, in favor of the child. The determination of whether
he had the capacity to exercise care for his safety under the circum-
stances should purely be a question of fact to be submitted to the
jury. The question would be: In this particular situation, did the
infant conform to the standard of conduct that is to be expected
from a child of like age, intelligence and experience?
Apparently, the present goal of the Kentucky court is to meas-
ure children by a standard of conduct that makes "no sudden leap
at any particular age."20 This cannot be attained by using the court's
current rule which arbitrarily divides the period of infancy into three
categories and has a presumption against the child if he is over a
certain age and one in his favor if he is below this age. If the solu-
tion suggested above were followed, the court's goal would be
achieved. If the child were three years old or above, his conduct
16See Annot., 174 A.L.R. 1080, 1104-10 (1948).
17 Id. at 1116.
18 Bodin v. Texas Co., 186 So. 390 (La. App. 1989); Borman v. LaFargue,
183 So. 548 (La. App. 1938).
'9 See Annot. 174 A.L.R. 1080, 1117-28 (1948).2 0 Baldwin v. Hosley, 328 S.W.2d 426, 430 (Ky. 1959).
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would be measured by the conduct of a child of like age, intelligence
and experience. There would be no presumption either in his favor
or against him. The standard of conduct for children would smoothly
increase as the child grew older, developed his intelligence and gained
new experiences. The conduct required of him would definitely
make "no sudden leap at any particular age."
The other reason for reversal exists because the Kentucky Court
of Appeals faced squarely the problem of what happens when the
"statute and infant meet."z2  Kentucky Revised Statutes section
189.570(4) (a), provides:
Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within
a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersec-
tion shall yield the right of way to all vehicles upon the roadway.
In essence, the instruction relating to the eight-year-old child's stat-
utory duty provided that he had a duty to comply with this statute
and gave no consideration to his infancy. This instruction would have
been sustained prior to this decision. It is correct in form where the
injured person is an adult.22 In the case of Thomas v. Dahl,23 the
rule applicable to the contributory negligence per se of an adult
who violates a statute was applied, without question, to a twelve-
year-old bicyclist who had violated a right-of-way statute. As a re-
sult of the principal case, that aspect of the Dahl case is overruled,
and it is now held that the infancy of a violator who is seven years
old or above must be considered in determining his statutory duty.
This was already the established rule for children under seven years
of age.
24
There are opposing views on the issue of whether infancy should
be considered at all in determining the child's right to recover when
he has violated a statute. Some courts do not consider the infancy
of the violator and take the view that the violation of the statute is
contributory negligence per se, barring recovery.25 The majority
of the courts, however, support the view that his infancy should be
given consideration in determining whether a child who has violated
a statute is contributorily negligent,20 and Kentucky now follows
this view. It seems that the majority view is better. If it is found that
a child of the same age, intelligence and experience ordinarily would
2 1 This problem was aptly given this title by Prof. I. Douglas Mertz in "The
Infant and Negligence Per Se in Pennsylvania," 51 Dick. L. Rev. 79 (1946).2 2 Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Byrnes, 296 Ky. 560, 178 S.W.2d
4 (1944).
23 293 Ky. 808, 170 S.W.2d 337 (1943).
24 Lehman v. Patterson, 298 Ky. 360, 182 S.W.2d 897 (1944).




have the capacity to understand and follow the pattern of conduct
required by the statute, his violation thereof could be deemed con-
tributory negligence, barring his recovery. On the other hand, if the
minority rule is followed, the special standard of care for children
is necessarily abrogated and their violation of the statute will be
characterized by the court as contributory negligence per se. The
courts generally recognize that a special standard of conduct applies
to children because they realize that an infant does not have the
capacity to perceive the inherent risks and dangers in certain sit-
uations.2 7 There is no reason to obliterate this standard merely be-
cause a statute has been violated. If the child does not have the
capacity to understand and follow the pattern of conduct required
by the statute, he should not be judged by it.
2 8
Frank N. King, Jr.
ToRTs-Jom=r To TFEAsoRs-APPORTnONMENT OF DAMAGES BY DEGOEES
OF NEGLIGENCE.- Plaintiff, after stopping his automobile, was struck
from the rear by a taxicab. A third car in the line of traffic stopped
short of impact, but was subsequently struck from the rear causing
it to collide with the taxicab, which was then forced into the plain-
tiff's car a second time. In an action against the owners and drivers
of the three cars, the trial court granted summary judgment on the
ground that plaintiff received two separate injuries and failed to
sustain his burden of proof as to which injury resulted from each
impact. Held: Reversed. No evidence was presented to sustain a find-
ing that planitiff incurred more than a single injury and where the
concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more
persons combine to cause a single injury to another,1 such persons
27 See, for example, Charbonneau v. MacRury, 84 N.H. 501, 153 Atl. 457
(1931); see also, Prosser, op. cit. supra mote 10, at 128; Restatement, op. cit. supra
note 7, § 283 comment e.
28 It appears that the court, in this portion of the decision, complied with
the general desire of the legislature. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 189.570(4)(d) (1959)
further provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of this subsection every operator of
a vehicle . . . shall exercise proper precaution upon observing a child
• . . upon a roadway.
Thiis, the legislature, realizing that children may lack the capacity to appreci-
ate the risk involved in running across a street at a place other than a cross-
walk, preferred to give protection to the infant violator.
I The difficulty posed by the cause-in-fact issue is overcome by holding that
only one tort occurred, and only the fact that each defendant's negligence was
involved need be shown. An analogy is drawn from the cases where death re-
sults from the independent successive negligence acts of two persons; the death
is presumed to have occurred subsequent to the second act of negligence. E.g.,
Miclli v. Hirsch, 52 Ohio L. abs. 426, 83 N.E.2d 240 (1948). See also 4 Re-
statement, Torts § 879 (1938), as qualified by § 881.
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